

25 April 1958

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY
ON DISARMAMENT

GENERAL: We feel that dropping the "inseparativity" clause will make our position appear much more reasonable to both the Soviets and our allies.

I. Nuclear Provisions

The provisions of this section should convince the majority of our allies and uncommitted nations that we are striving for a sound and reasonable solution to the nuclear problem. The period of a test suspension should provide a clear opportunity for the rest of the world to judge whether the Soviet Union is sincere in its alleged desire for a relaxation of tensions. Furthermore, continued delay in the adoption of a test suspension by the U.S. provides additional opportunity for the USSR to withdraw from its unilateral suspension. If this were to happen, the USSR could then advance the argument that it was forced to withdraw by U.S. intransigence and "warmongering." This would give the USSR double propaganda mileage out of their unilateral test suspension.

We still feel that it would be to the advantage of the U.S. if we were to announce a short unilateral cessation of the production of nuclear material for weapons purposes. This would emphasize the importance which we place on cessation, and put pressure on the USSR on this issue. In view of the great future demand in the U.S. for nuclear material for peaceful purposes and the stock of nuclear weapons already available, we believe that the U.S. could take this action without jeopardizing U.S. security.

We recommend that the clause prohibiting transfer of nuclear weapons be dropped on the grounds that the Soviets probably have more reason to fear the transfer of nuclear weapons than we do.

II. Inspection Against Surprise Attack

Agreement on any or all of the inspection zones mentioned would materially improve the ability of U.S. intelligence to get advance warning of an impending Soviet attack. The gain on the Soviet side would not be as great because of the relatively greater openness of free-world areas. On the same grounds we strongly support the proposal for ground inspection posts beyond the limits of an inspection zone. Even a European zone by itself would be a material gain to western intelligence. There would also be material gains from a European inspection zone in the form of greater western contact with European satellites and increased restriction of Soviet freedom of action in that area.

JCS and OSD
Declassification/Release

MORI/CDE

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It should be noted that Governor Stassen first mentioned informally to the Soviets a zone running to 30° East. They responded with a counter-proposal to 25° East. Our later proposal of 35° East was regarded by them as not in keeping with this bargaining sequence.

III. Reductions of Armed Forces and Armaments

No Comment.

IV. Missiles and Outer Space

We believe that it would be highly desirable to place major emphasis on the positive aspects of the peaceful uses of outer space and reduce emphasis on or eliminate the section on the control aspects of the missile problem. In view of the newness of the missile art in general, and the rapid technological change inherent in the current state of the art, we question the definition of the missiles to be considered for control. It might well be that further study would show that some other definition might be more to the U.S. advantage. We do not know that this will be so, but feel that the problem is too important to allow the U.S. position to become fixed on the basis of the study done so far.

We also feel that a call for the elimination of missiles already fabricated is open to the same objections that we raise to the Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons. Namely, we feel that both proposals are probably equally uninspectable. If our missile elimination proposal were accepted, the USSR might be able to retain a clandestine missile capability in view of their large supply of missiles already built. Furthermore, if we advance this proposal, the USSR might be able to say that we could equally well accept their proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapons. This we should avoid.

We feel that, in general, Soviet development of missiles is probably far ahead of the counterpart U.S. effort and that a cessation of missile development and testing in the next year or two might leave the USSR with an unacceptable advantage over the U.S. in its knowledge of the missile art.

V. Control Organization

No Comment.



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